<u>Social Divisions and War</u>:
How Societal Elites Divide and Conquer

Kayla Pincus
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Abstract

This paper analyzes the effects of neoliberal motivations on war. The societal elite are involved in the funding of media, the control of government, and the profiting off of conflict. Social dominance is promoted in the media to elicit war and nationalism which directly profits the production of a range of resources not limited to the military industry. Most importantly, these internal and external divisions create havoc, resulting in the masses' inability to act in a concerted effort to fairly distribute wealth. Any attempt to do so results in the relegation to the out-group.

In the United States (and often beyond), a small group of power elites stand to tremendously benefit from war and conflict. Social dominance theory and class warfare create a perfect storm for socioeconomic and other demographically-based forms of discrimination, which causes instability. This dysphoria is part of a more long-term production of nationalism and hatred for the imagined "others". Neoliberalism - an economic theory that supports the unfettered "free-market" - by definition, fosters the system that allows capitalization of anything, including war.

This paper looks from an interdisciplinary perspective to analyze the connection between war and capitalism: historical, economic and psychological. I will illustrate that divisions are created, how they are created by the media, how those divisions create war, who benefits from war, and how those people are connected to the media and the political spheres that enable war. These functions have the ability to operate in any developed (as opposed to developing) economic and media system and are not limited to the scope of the U.S.

Divisions are created between social groups within a country and between populations of countries. Social identity theory, social dominance theory, and nationalism help illuminate the psychological and historical trends of these divisions. Many of the following theories can be applied to a variety of populations, but these are perceptions of human functioning and history - not laws - and should be taken as such.

Social Identity and Realistic Group Conflict Theory

Realistic group conflict theory (RCT) (Muzafer Sherif et. al & D.T. Campbell, 1965) states that intergroup hostility and competition over scarce resources is an essential quality that is

motivated by rewards (Deutsch, 1949b; Julian, 1968). This competition lends itself into social

conflict. This competition between groups results in the bonding of the in-group (Vinacke, 1964;

Fiedler, 1967; Kalin & Marlowe, 1968). So, the development of conflict between groups results

in the bonding within one or both of the groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; 33). These researchers

believe that, due to a scarcity of resources in the world, human beings are bound to compete with

one another. This competition causes conflict facilitated by the formation of groups. This group

formation then causes for the members of the groups to consider themselves the in-group, while

the conflicting group is relegated to being the out-group. An "us" group is articulated; a "them"

group is articulated. Increasingly over time, the members of each group will respond to the other

group's members initially as group-members rather than individuals. They become seen as

"undifferentiated items in a unified social category" (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; 36).

In terms of the formation of the in- and out-groups, they must have features that are

relevant for comparison: "...[P]roximity and situational salience are among the variables that

determine out-group comparability, and pressures toward in-group distinctiveness should

increase as a function of this comparability" (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; 41). Adding to the

contributing factors of the increased separation of social groups, the minimal groups paradigm

states that simple awareness of an out-group, in and of itself, can cause in-group favoritism. This

paradigm spontaneously leads to subsequent intergroup competition *even when acting on that*

conflict contradicts acting in one's own self-interest (Tajfel, 1971; Ferguson & Kelley, 1964;

Rabbie & Wilkens, 1971; Doise & Weinberger, 1973). In situations where social class and

standing is based on an unequal division of resources (i.e. power, prestige, wealth), hatred

between the over- and underprivileged groups will be generated (Oberschall, 1973; 33, see also

Chapters 5 and 12; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; 36). In-group members with higher status discriminate against those in the out-group of a lower status regardless of the existence of any personal interaction with members of that group (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Social status can be defined as, "ranking or hierarchy of perceived prestige" (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; 37).

Individuals are interested in identifying themselves within a social group that they see in a positive light. That positive identity is largely based on comparisons with the in-group and contrastations with the out-group (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; 40).

Social Dominance Theory

Social dominance theory (SDT) states that, "...intergroup oppression, discrimination, and prejudice are the means by which human societies organize themselves as group-based hierarchies, in which members of dominant groups secure a disproportionate share of the good things in life (e.g., powerful roles, good housing, good health), and members of subordinate groups receive a disproportionate share of the bad things in life (e.g., relatively poor housing and poor health)" (Sidanius & Pratto, 2012; 2). Social status categories and distinctions are constructed through human interaction and include race, caste, ethnicity, nationality, economic class, religion, etc. (Sidanius & Pratto, 2012).

Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) is the propensity for a person to desire that their in-group identification be dominant over out-groups. The level of this orientation determines that individual's propensity to discriminate against the out-group (Sidanius, 1993). The Social Dominance Scale (SDS) measures an individual's SDO: their propensity toward group dominance and group antiegalitarianism (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Some items of the SDS

include the following and are assessed using a 5-point likert scale (strongly disagree to strongly agree).

The following pertain to the group dominance component:

- "It's probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the bottom,"
- "Inferior groups should stay in their place,"
- "Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place,"

The following pertain to the group antiegalitarianism component:

- "We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups,"
- "We should increase social equality"
- "We would have fewer problems if we treated different groups more equally." (Peña & Sidanius, 2002; 785)

When a social identity is threatened in some form, members of that group can react with social creativity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; 43), where they redefine the terms of the identities at play to create a better standing for themselves. Similarly, switching the group to which one group compares itself should decrease inferiority and "self-esteem should recover" (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; 44). Within the inferior group, individuals reduce inferiority by comparing themselves with one another as opposed to externally with the superior group (Hyman, 1942). This behavior explains the phenomenon of the intense racism experienced by blacks from poor whites in the U.S. (i.e. 'I may be poor, but at least I am not black') (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; 44). Research shows that the definition and distancing from an out-group is more consequential to the in-group members than that of in-group closeness (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; 39). In short, hate for the out-group is more important than love for the in-group, showing that the real focus of this phenomenon is on the distancing from others, or "othering".

SDT was largely founded on the phenomenon that unequal circumstances provoke grouping and subsequent discrimination (Pratto, 1999). The consequences of SDT span beyond individual interactions and interpersonal power relations: such shared categories lead to systematic inequality (Tilly, 1998) where discrimination is institutionalized (e.g., Feagin and Feagin, 1978). "Segregation in workplaces, neighborhoods, and service institutions does is to constrain which groups have access to resources" (Sidanius & Pratto, 2012, 14). SDT was influenced by components of the following intellectual perspectives (Sidanius & Pratto, 2012; 9-10):

- Authoritarian personality theory (a psychoanalytic approach to understanding the intersection between child-rearing practices, personality development, political ideology and prejudice; see Adorno et al., 1950);
- early social identity theory (a psychological theory of intergroup discrimination composed of three basic elements: (a) social categorization, (b) psychological identification, and (c) social comparison and, if possible, the achievement of a positive comparison between an ingroup and an outgroup; see Tajfel and Turner, 1986);
- Rokeach's two-value theory of political behavior (the notion that political behavior is a joint function of the value one places on both equality and freedom; see Rokeach, 1973);
- Blumer's (1960) group position theory (the notion that racial prejudice is a result of attempts to establish and maintain favorable positions within a social hierarchy);
- Marxism (Gramsci, 1971; Marx and Engels, 1846);
- neoclassical elitism theory (or the notion that social hierarchies are ubiquitous and essentially inevitable; see Michels, 1911; Mosca, 1896; Pareto, 1901);
- industrial/organizational psychology (Bretz and Judge, 1994); and
- sociological work on institutional discrimination (Hood and Cordovil, 1992), cultural ideologies (e.g., Sanday, 1981), evolutionary biology (Trivers, 1972), evolutionary psychology (Betzig, 1993; van den Berghe, 1978) and biological anthropology (Dickemann, 1979).

Hierarchy-enhancing social institutions "...allocate social resources to the advantage of dominant groups and to the disadvantage of subordinate groups" (Sidanius & Pratto, 2012; 3). Examples of such institutions include components of the following: internal security forces, the

criminal justice system, and large corporations. Conversely, hierarchy-attenuating institutions work to counter this allocation of social resources. Examples of hierarchy-attenuating institutions include human rights and civil rights organizations, charities, and legal aid groups for the poor (Sidanius et al., 1996). Group-based social hierarchy of a given society is based on the interaction between various hierarchy-enhancing and hierarchy-attenuating forces (Sidanius & Pratto, 2012; 4).

Components of the criminal justice system in the U.S. exemplify a hierarchy-enhancing institution. Deterrence and retribution account for only part of the motivations behind the American prison system; there exists evidence that it too exists for the purpose of the continuation of group-based inequality and dominance of White Americans over Black Americans and other minorities (Sidanius & Pratto, 2012; 17). "Consistent with the expectations of SDT, the evidence shows that the death penalty tends to be disproportionately used against subordinates (e.g., the poor and ethnic minorities), especially when these subordinates have been convicted of capital crimes against dominants" (Sidanius & Pratto, 2012; 16; Sidanius and Pratto, 1999).

Intergroup conflict holds at stake social status, which represents the power to socially and economically benefit the in-group (Sidanius & Pratto, 2012; 19). Dominant groups establish and maintain their dominance through physical force and intimidation and through the monopolization of ideas and norms. This narration of the line between in-groups and out-groups in SDT is called "legitimizing myths" (Sidanius, 2012). Pareto called it fraud (Pareto, 1935). These terms refer to "...[T]he use of consensually shared social ideology functioning to legitimize the dominant position of the powerful over the powerless… A more potent means of

sustaining hierarchy is by controlling social legitimacy. Marxists refer to these legitimacy instruments as 'ideology' and 'false consciousness,' Mosca refers them by the term 'political formula,' Pareto uses the notion of 'derivations,' and Gramsci invokes the idea of 'ideological hegemony.' All these assert that elites maintain control over subordinates by controlling what is and what is not considered legitimate discourse, and promoting the idea that the rule of elites is moral, just, necessary, inevitable, and fair" (Sidanius & Pratto, 2012; 10).

Patriotism and Nationalism: Entering the realm of sociology, politics, and conflict studies

This section connects social dominance theory with nationalism and the development of international conflicts. The internal conflicts within a nation (such as the U.S.) destabilize populations and are re-stabilized by external conflicts with other countries. The same phenomenon is being played out: internal disorder within populations seems to dissipate with the introduction of external conflicts. In the U.S. and in other nations with advanced economic inequality, divisions exist within the population that distract from economic inequality. The implementation of American nationalism adds to the distraction from economic inequality as well as from its internal divisions. Overall, this state of perpetual conflict results in the loss of autonomy of the people. As long as the people of a nation who suffer from the consequences of economic inequality are distracted and disoriented, they are unable to act in concerted effort to redistribute wealth. Therefore, societal elites have a distinct motivation to promote group conflicts both within their own country and with others.

What is nationalism

Patriotism can be defined as love of and pride in a nation (Peña & Sidanius, 2002; 783). In contrast, nationalism has many related definitions. It can be defined as a sense of national superiority and dominance over other nations and peoples (Feshbach, 1994; de Figueiredo & Elkins, 2000; Sidanius et al., 1997). This setup is contingent upon the defining of in-groups and out-groups, and has therefore been shown to positively correlate with ideologies like ethnocentrism, xenophobia, and social dominance orientation (de Figueiredo & Elkins, 2000; Lea, 1996; Pratto et al., 2000; Sidanius et al., 1997). A broader definition of nationalism can be defined as, "support for political action in favour of one's own set of people, whatever that may be, where usually the political action in question is attainment of autonomy or independence, or prevailing over other states" (Whitmeyer, 2002; 322). A similar definition of nationalism is, "the doctrine that a people who see themselves as distinct in their origins, culture, history, institutions, or principles should rule themselves in a political system that expresses and protects those distinctive characteristics" (Snyder, 2000). Smith (2001) articulates a list of nationalism components:

- A process of national formation
- A sentiment or consciousness of belonging to the nation
- A language and symbolism of the nation
- A social and political movement on behalf of the nation
- A doctrine and/or ideology of the nation (Schrock-Jacobson, 2012; 837)

Schrock-Jacobson articulates the circumstance of nationalism:

> "First, a politically relevant nationalist party is present. A party is politically relevant if it achieves a victory in a presidential election, a majority of seats in the national legislature, control of the most prominent cabinet positions, or the ability to affect coalition building. Second, the state has laws limiting the rights, freedoms, and activities of groups not considered part of the 'nation'. Such laws could be restrictions on citizenship rights, use of a native language, membership in cultural or religious organizations, and/or political participation.

Third, the government engages in behaviors that disproportionately benefit the national group with an eye toward defending and reinforcing national distinctiveness. Fourth, there is significant internal or external conflict short of war which the state justifies by arguing that the nation's existence, identity, and/or traditions are threatened. Fifth, the state takes other military actions that it contends will protect the 'nation' and its interests (e.g., the militarization of disputed territory)." (Schrock-Jacobson, 2012; 837)

Schrock-Jacobson summarizes Snyder and Smith's's four types of nationalism:

(Schrock-Jacobson, 2012; 838-9)

- Civic nationalism: "...emphasizes loyalty to a set of political ideas and institutions that promotes justice, tolerance, and the rule of law and includes in the nation anyone bom or who has lived for a long time within the national territory (Snyder, 2000)."
- Ethnic nationalism: "...stresses the importance of common culture, language, religion, historical memory, and/or kinship in constructing and maintaining the nation. It excludes anyone who does not have the necessary cultural, linguistic, religious, and/ or ethnic attributes (Smith, 2004; Snyder, 2000)."
- Revolutionary nationalism: "...frames national defense and self-rule in terms of protecting a revolutionary political regime. To be a member of the national family and obtain the resulting rights and privileges, one must support the regime's ideology, objectives, methods, and organization. Anyone who threatens the regime's stability is excluded from national membership (Snyder, 2000)."
- Counterrevolutionary nationalism: "perceives national well-being as primarily served by resistance to internal factions and external foes seeking to weaken traditional political, social, and/or economic institutions. It excludes from national membership any social classes, religions, cultural groups, and adherents to "alternative" political ideologies that might change the status quo (Snyder, 2000)."

Popular nationalism is the expression of nationalism by non-elites. Elites can be defined as, "people with attributes that lead them to be ranked higher and accorded more prestige and respect than ordinary people. These attributes include being politically or administratively powerful, being rich or propertied, having a title or high official rank, being well-educated, being a star, and so forth" (Whitmeyer, 2002; 322).

A 2002 study showed a positive correlation in White Americans between their propensity to subordinate perceived inferior groups with their level of U.S. patriotism. This finding links social dominance, patriotism, and nationalism (Peña & Sidanius, 2002). Another component of SDT shows that not all groups respond the same to one another. Depending on their status as a dominant or subordinate group, the former has the potential to express counterdominant sentiment and action. Therefore, the status of in-groups and out-groups as dominant or subordinate societally contributes to different reactions (Sidanius, 2004). In the same 2002 study, there showed a negative correlation in Latino Americans between their dominance propensity and their U.S. patriotism (Peña & Sidanius, 2002; 782, 786). In other words, dominant groups who have a propensity to subordinate perceived inferior groups identify with love of the U.S., while subordinate groups with a propensity toward dominance do not identify positively with the U.S.

One theory of nationalism states that, through a state's creation of nation-categories, people and policies are oriented toward those categories, causing subsequent nationalism of those groupings (Brubaker, 1996, as cited in Whitmeyer, 2002; 327-8). Brubaker, pointing in large part to the formation of the Soviet states, emphasizes the nature of nations as elite constructs, and their corresponding nationalisms as elite constructs (Brubaker 1996, as cited in Whitmeyer, 2002; 324). Non-elites are nationalized by elites who create ideas and identity groups relating to the nation (Anderson, 1983; Greenfeld, 1992; Kedourie, 1993, as cited in Whitmeyer, 2002; 326) Another theory of nationalism and ethnocentrism is that its foundations stem from a favoritism for one's own extended kin, despite that this is rarely the case (van den Berghe, 1981; Shaw & Wong, 1989). People want to support the people they perceive their descendants will marry. This

psychological process can be used and manipulated by elites (Johnson, 1986; Goetze, 2001, as cited in Whitmeyer, 2002; 325). Elites affect means of communication of nationalism through its expansion and constraint and capitalize on people's minimal endogamous set (Whitmeyer, 1997a) by manipulating geographic mobility and urbanization (Whitmeyer, 2002; 333). Physically, geographically redefining the extents and borders between nations causes nationalism, such was the case in Hungary, Slovakia (Haynes, 1995), Germany and Austria (Katzenstein, 1976).

How elites persuade nationalism

> "States have been shown to employ a wide array of tools to instill nationalism in their citizens. They invent and constantly reinforce 'national flags, symbols, anthems, holidays, rituals, and traditions' (Tilly 1994, 140). They create public schools and mandate national histories to be taught in them (e.g., Lewis 1975). They establish national museums; construct national monuments; name and rename streets, schools, and government buildings for national 'heroes'; and glorify national symbols in postage stamps and money (Centeno 2002, 178-83). They use the 'powerful machinery for communicating with their inhabitants' through media of all forms "to spread the image and heritage of the 'nation' and to inculcate attachment to it and to attach all to country and flag" (Hobsbawm 1990, 91). And they enlist their supporters—particularly those among businesspeople and the intelligentsia—to also repeat and spread the myth of nationalism (Tilly 1994, 140)" (Solt, 2011; 821).

It has been shown that, largely, elites create and persuade nationalism (Rogowski 1985; Brass 1991). Social, political, intellectual (primarily urban intellectuals (Hobsbawm 1990; Schulze 1996) and cultural elites were shown to have caused nationalism in Serbia (Snyder 2000), Eastern Europe (Hroch 1985), in Western Europe (Gellner 1993; Greenfeld 1992; Dann 1993; Weber 1976), in Russia and territories of the Soviet Union (Brubaker; 1996; Hosking 1997, 2001; Kaiser 1994), of Kurds and Turks (Behrendt 1993), in Japan (Craig 1961; Linhart

1994). They were nationalistic before their territory's population and serve as propagandists for that nationalism (Whitmeyer, 2002; 326). Other examples of the role that elites play in the presence of nationalism include the nationalistic literature of Manzoni's novel I Promessi Sposi for Italy, the nationalistic music of Smetana's operas, Verdi's operas, and Chopin's polonaises, the nationalistic celebrations of music festivals organized in Latvia and Estonia (Lieven, 1994). These examples do not even touch on the blaring example of the Olympic games as nationalist propaganda. Historically, such as with Vuk Karadzic's creation of the Stokavian dialect in Serbia-Croatia, intellectual elites will write a set of grammatical rules and a dictionary to create a standardized language, causing another angle of manipulation through what could broadly be referred to as communications media (Jelavich, 1990, as cited in Whitmeyer, 2002; 326-7). Elites narrate national histories. This applied to Palacky in the Czech Republic (Morison, 1995), Karamzin in Russia (Hosking, 1997), and Jesuits for Chile and Mexico after being expelled by Spain (Fuentes, 1992, as cited in Whitmeyer, 2002; 327) Among the examples of elites directly organizing politically for nationalism include the Russia's "Go to the People" movement in the late 1800s (Kaiser, 1994).

The defining of the "other", out-group, and group which is excluded is integral to nationalism. While this can be an expression of positive self-identity, it is just as if not more likely to produce distaste for separateness from the defined others. In establishing the "other", nationalism portrays that out-group as having a series of undesirable qualities, including more obstinance, liability for historical transgressions, and weaker than they are (Snyder, 2000), resulting in a subsequent likelihood of victory in the case of potential war. However, due to their

perceived "evil", the out-group is considered a physical threat to the in-group's sovereignty and identity (Schrock-Jacobson, 2012; 829).

Malesevic refers to centrifugal ideologization as the process by which normative ideological doctrines created by elites permeate the structures of society (Malešević, 2010). The last two centuries have seen a dramatic increase in the ability for social organizations to be coerced and penetrated (Malešević, 2010). Public education, mass media, the military, police, administrative agencies, social movements, civil society networks and family units all play an active role in the prevalence of a nationalism (Malešević, 2011; 17). Nationalism becomes embedded in society in unnoticeable processes and social norms such as rhetoric in mass media, education, marketing, political speeches, entertainment, banknotes and even stamps and space exploration broadcasting (Malešević, 2011; 20). "By privileging knowledge, instrumental efficiency and institutional teleology, bureaucratic organizations have proved capable of imposing strict discipline, social control and organizational loyalty" (Malešević, 2011; 23).

Mobilization is required to develop national conflict, and that mobilization depends, in large part, upon elites. National conflict is almost certain to halt when mobilization for it is suppressed by elites (Kaufman 2001; Snyder 2000). "Elites may provide occasion and opportunity for the expression of nationalism; they may organize it; they may provide relevant information, whether lies, half-lies or truths" (Whitmeyer, 2002; 333). Elites have the capability to exercise power over the *expression* of popular nationalism (Mann, 1986; Whitmeyer, 1997b) and communication is key to nationalism (Deutsch, 1966; Katzenstein, 1976).

Some theorize that elites do not create nationalism but provide the structure for and the rationality behind it (Gellner, 1983, 1997, as cited in Whitmeyer, 2002; 325). Elites may not have

a monopoly on the "creation of ideas" (Whitmeyer, 2002; 326), but their power and influence makes them more capable of harnessing them than non-elites. Communications media is instrumental to the formation of nationalism, and those media are controlled by some variation of governmental, intellectual, or business elites. These elites manipulate symbols and conceptions of ethnicity through media to frame identity and subsequent nationalism based on their own corresponding interests (Brass 1991). European colonialism can be considered a type of global-scale nationalism led by elite (European) countries (Kedourie 1993; Davidson 1992; Greenfeld 1992). Anderson emphasizes the historic role of the press (what he calls "printmen" (Anderson, 1983: 65)) in the formation of imagined communities and nationalisms (as cited in Whitmeyer, 2002; 324).

The government has control of its own resources, whose influences reach deeply into our social systems. Those resources include control over public education, the ability to instate an army draft (which can lead to nationalist indoctrination (Flermet, 1996)), implementation of nationalist organizations, holidays, commemorations, parades and celebrations, mass media (newspapers, radio, television) and control of information. Governments also hold the ability to suppress unofficial languages in public, government and education as well as the ability to suppress organizing alternate nationalisms (Whitmeyer, 2002; 327-8). Nationalism led by elites is more likely to endure than that led by non-elites because of their advanced organizing capabilities (Kaufman, 2001, as cited in Whitmeyer, 2002; 329). The actions of anti-government elite nationalists are limited to what the government allows, however they implement similar strategies such as - to the best of their ability - creating nationalist organizations, influencing public education, organizing nationalist celebrations, suppressing official languages, drafting

people into a nationalist rebel army, and "dispensing information and misinformation and making emotional appeals through the media" (Whitmeyer, 2002; 328).

Examples of instances when nationalism was used to justify mass murder include the Russian killing of Chechens (Remnick, 1997), Serbian and Bosnian Serbs extermination of Bosnian Muslims (under orders from Serbian government) (Sudetic, 1998), Sinhalese killing of Tamils in Sri Lanka with government-supplied hit lists (Tambiah, 1986; Kearney, 1986; McGowan, 1992, as cited in Whitmeyer, 2002; 334-5), and Rwanda's Hutu government's genocide of Tutsis (D.N. Smith, 1998; Snyder, 2000). The Hutu government of Rwanda promoted anti-Tutsi propaganda in the Rwandan media leading up to and during the 1993 genocide (D.N. Smith, 1998; Snyder, 2000). The genocide in Rwanda was systematic, organized, and used bureaucratic institutions and "articulated ideological blueprints" (Malešević, 2011; 24) to carry out its nationalistic goal. Rwanda was considered to be the 'Switzerland of Africa' - a state with "chillingly purposeful bureaucratic control" (Oplinger, 1990; 260). With precision and efficiency, the Rwandan genocide was coordinated by the highest governmental elites (Reyntjens, 1996). The central government, Rwandan bourgeoisie and local councilors directed the slaughter (Prunier, 1997, as cited in Malešević, 2011; 25). Popular nationalism was the developing factor of the organized genocide (Hintjens, 1999; Mamdani, 2001, as cited in Malešević, 2011; 26) In Sri Lanka, Sinhalese political elites used the media to push anti-Tamils propaganda (MGowan, 1992, as cited in Whitmeyer, 2002; 335). European fascist governments, such as that of Nazi Germany, did not punish anti-semitic actions. Similarly, the Sri Lankan government stopped punishing anti-Tamil actions and began promoting it. These governmental

actions led to a severe increase in discriminatory behavior (Tambiah, 1986, as cited in Whitmeyer, 2002; 335).

Brass analyzed links between elite interests and Hindu and Muslim cultural symbols in South Asia in the 1800s and 1900s. He observed that, over time, the religious teachings of Sharia are used in the context of political discourse when the ulema (Muslim intellectual elites) or the secular Muslim elites are feeling a threat to their power over the Muslim community (Brass, 1991; 99). These islamic symbols are used "in pursuit of competitive advantage against rivals from other communities and as a base for achieving political power…" (Brass, 1991; 102). He remarked, "Some symbols are emotionally powerful, but may be dangerous to use— not only because their use threatens civil disorder, but because their use will benefit one elite group rather than another." (Brass, 1991; 101). Creation and manipulation of symbols by elites is incredibly complex, intricate and delicate, as these symbols must ultimately be in accordance with each other. Otherwise, they will not create a cohesive narrative. Manipulation of symbols to achieve unity and solidarity of an in-group against an out-group has the potential to inadvertently alienate certain communities within the in-group and create internal division. (Brass, 1991; 101)

Why elites use nationalism

Some theorists see popular nationalism as a construct of capitalist interests (Breuilly, 1993). Elites are often instrumental in the manipulated expression of nationalism for the purpose of profiting from it (Brass, 1991; Breuilly, 1993; Kaufman, 2001; Snyder, 2000, as cited in Whitmeyer, 2002; 333). Hitler and Bandaranaike enabled its expression; governments in Nazi Germany, Bosnia, Rwanda, and Sri Lanka organized and led persecution of out-groups. Elites

have the capability to "raise fears and change opportunities and incentives, such as wars and partitions of territories" (Whitmeyer, 2002; 337). Governments promote nationalism for the purpose of promoting war, redistribution of wealth, controlling group members' behavior, collecting taxes and suppressing alternate nationalist ideologies (Whitmeyer, 2002; 327). Political motivations contribute to the role that elites play in the dissemination of nationalism (Brass, 1991; Breuilly, 1993; Ignatieff, 1993; Snyder, 2000). These elites promote a sense of a need for separation from a defined out-group, a need for autonomy or a need for their in-group to receive privileges. Nationalism is used to overthrow governments if such governing is perceived to be coming from an outside state. (Whitmeyer, 2002; 327) Donald Trump, for example, used this tactic during the 2016 election. Politicians redefine "Americanism" and its out-group: to Trump, the out-group was defined as the "swamp" (established government) itself. This definition was contrasted with the in-group: "the people", led by none other than Trump himself. Therefore, the perceived faux government was overthrown by perceived honest representation.

Nationalism is also implemented in countries by elites in circumstances of severe inequality in order to distract the population from demanding redistributive policies. It has been shown that the more economic inequality exists in a country, the more nationalism is generated (Solt, 2011, 821; Posen, 1993; Van Evera, 1990). Feelings of nationalism "anesthetize… citizens" (Solt, 2011; 822) and persuade the public to feel more positively about their circumstances so as not to revolt (Van Evera, 1985). Rosa Luxemburg described "the nation as a homogenous social and political entity" (Luxemburg, 1976) used to hide inequalities within the in-group and silence dissenting voices. (Solt, 2011; 822) Economic inequality leads to increased

ethnocentrism- specifically, hostility towards immigrants and minorities (Li and Brewer, 2004, as cited in Solt, 2011; 829)

The concept of nationalism allows elites to make claims that redistribution only benefits some sectors of the population, and is therefore antithetical to the goals of "the nation" at large (Solt, 2011; 822). So, the development of social dominance distracts from economic inequality and social stratification while creating ethnic instability internally. Meanwhile, the development of nationalism disallows for that internal struggle to develop too substantially, because such dissent is framed as anti-nationalistic. The economic interests of the elite become synonymous with the economic interest of "the nation", and therefore the emphasis on these issues is allowed in public debate (i.e. deregulation on corporations). Impoverished peoples then hold onto this national, elite identity because it makes them feel more identified with the elite class (Shayo, 2009). This concept relates directly to the phenomenon of poor white racism against blacks in the U.S. previously discussed. Pointedly, it has been shown that domestic inequality is a more significant contributing factor in the creation of nationalism than that of international inequality (Solt, 2011; 828-9). From a policy angle, any opposition to the elite's policy platforms can be suppressed under the umbrella of it being a national threat. Hitler positioned liberals, Jews, socialists and others as in opposition to the German volk and therefore a threat in need of silencing (Benz, 2006; Mansfield & Snyder, 2005, as cited in Schrock-Jacobson, 2012; 830).

The goals of the political elites are written into the nationalism (rhetoric, symbols, etc.) that they sell to the masses. Such goals can include acquiring land, controlling natural resources, or protecting domestic companies from "globalization's pressures" (Schrock-Jacobson, 2012; 828). These goals become one with the narrative of "the nation". Eventually, the masses will

agree to whatever is deemed necessary to protect that nation. Elites do not have complete

autonomy in this venture, however, because the story they tell must remain in accordance to the

nation's "traditions, myths, history, memories, symbols, beliefs, or its 'usable past' to gain

acceptance" (Schrock-Jacobson, 2012; 828). Nationalism unites the public around shared beliefs

regarding international affairs. The perceived need for protection of national sovereignty

motivates skepticism of international cooperation (Schrock-Jacobson, 2012; 829). Nationalism

has been shown to cause demand for increased national security and an overall interventionist

role in foreign affairs (Conover and Feldman 1987) even when it is at the expense of civil

liberties (Davis & Silver, 2004, as cited in Solt, 2011; 829) (this finding is very related to a

finding articulated in the previous section: *the minimal groups paradigm states that simple*

awareness of an out-group, in and of itself, can cause in-group favoritism. This paradigm

spontaneously leads to subsequent intergroup competition even when acting on that conflict

contradicts acting in one's own self-interest (Tajfel, 1971; Ferguson & Kelley, 1964; Rabbie &

Wilkens, 1971; Doise & Weinberger, 1973)). In other words, people hate out-groups more than

like their in-groups.

Paranoia leads to the sentiment that military action is the only means of survival. The

potential costs of war are outweighed by what seems to be its benefits, which often consist of the

maintenance of morally superior culture, language, and religion. If these causes are not fought,

the national identity could erode. Such issues are less diplomatically compromisable and are

"frequently seen as zero-sum issues" (Schrock-Jacobson, 2012; 830-4).

> "American nationalism's role in war initiation is instructive... American
> national identity is predicated, in part, upon the myth of Americans'
> manliness, innate innocence, and providential destiny compared to the
> weakness, culpability, and decadence of 'enemy-others' (e.g., the Native
> Americans and communists). Therefore, Americans view their political

values and institutions as inherently superior (Lieven 2004; Pei 2003). This conviction imbues Americans with a widespread missionary spirit. They believe that their exceptional qualities imply their right to exert their power in the world, so as to spread the 'universal values' of democracy and capitalism (McCartney 2002). This conception of American national identity drives a continuous militant foreign policy (Hixson 2008)" (Schrock-Jacobson, 2012; 830).

As has been mentioned previously, nationalism has been demonstrated to play a role in war; examples include Nazi Germany's lebensraum, Vietnam's independence movement, the collapse of communism in Yugoslavia (Schrock-Jacobson, 2012; 826), and many previously stated examples as well. The mass army in France introduced nationalism on the global stage during the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars (Posen, 1993, as cited in Schrock-Jacobson, 2012; 843). Nationalism has increased the U.S.'s and others nations' involvement in international conflict (Fousek, 2000; Hixson, 2008; Lieven, 2004, as cited in Schrock-Jacobson, 2012; 827). Nationalism distracts its country's citizens from engaging with their own political and economic structures by focusing on conflict with other nations (Gagnon, 1994, as cited in Schrock-Jacobson, 2012; 827-8). Schrock-Jacobson's empirical work shows that all types of regimes (democratic and nondemocratic) are prone to engage in international conflict with the presence of nationalism (Schrock-Jacobson, 2012; 828).

In summary, nationalism leads to war in the following ways:

"First, nationalism entails the identification and vilification of 'others,' which can provoke violent responses if these 'national enemies' and their foreign allies can resist. Second, nationalism promotes the use of biased strategic assumptions. Third, certain domestic interest groups may benefit from belligerent nationalist foreign policies and lobby for their continuation and possible escalation. Fourth, elites can more easily marginalize opposition groups by depicting them as national threats. Finally, nationalism provides a favorable setting for 'nationalist bidding wars' among the elites and between them and the masses. When these processes are operative, nationalism should increase the probability of interstate war initiation" (Schrock-Jacobson, 2012; 846-7).

Conclusion

This paper has looked from an interdisciplinary perspective at what motivates war: how divisions are created within and across countries, who is largely responsible for these divisions and why they incite inter- and intragroup conflict. Societal elites use various forms of communication media to promote divisions between people to advance their economic and power interests: the more disjointed a society, the less able it is to unite and appropriately distribute wealth. The use of promoting nationalism to distract from economic inequality "narrows the scope of democratic politics" (Solt, 2011; 829). Therefore, this capitalist venture is antithetical to democracy. This research shows the need to question the "powers-at-be" and our trust in their intentions regarding our well-being. The most un-American activity is materializing divisions between Americans and other nations in order to disorient and disable those people from experiencing economic opportunity equality. There are many motivations of the societal elite to seek out conflict and war. Future research will address these motivations more practically with a particular focus on the military-industrial-media complex.

Similar to Schrock-Jacobson, "While I take an elite-driven perspective on nationalism and warfare, I do not dismiss 'the people's' role in creating, maintaining, and transforming the nation and its nationalism. The literature certainly criticizes such a top-down conceptualization of nations and nationalism. The construction and continuation of the nation and its associated ideologies is the product of reciprocal interactions between the political elites, the intelligentsia, and the masses." (Schrock-Jacobson, 2012; Notes 848).

One notable experience during my research involved the variance in disciplines used to address different questions relating to the overarching topic: the research on social dominance is

under the psychology discipline, while the literature on nationalism and the elite's role in conflict is anthropological, historical, sociological, and political in nature. This scope of perspective is valuable in that it provides for a more wholesome analysis. However, the writing style of each discipline points to the reality that - whether operating in the discipline of anthropology or psychology - findings are largely subjective and up for disagreement.

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